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Abstract—The increasing popularity of autonomous and
remotely-piloted drones have paved the way for several use-cases,
e.g., merchandise delivery and surveillance. In many scenarios,
estimating with zero-touch the weight of the payload carried by
a drone before its physical approach could be attractive, e.g., to
provide an early tampering detection.
In this paper, we investigate the possibility to remotely detect
the weight of the payload carried by a commercial drone by
analyzing its acoustic fingerprint. We characterize the difference
in the thrust needed by the drone to carry different pay-
loads, resulting in significant variations of the related acoustic
fingerprint. We applied the above findings to different use-
cases, characterized by different computational capabilities of the
detection system. Results are striking: using the Mel-Frequency
Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) components of the audio signal and
different Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifiers, we achieved
a minimum classification accuracy of 98% in the detection of the
specific payload class carried by the drone, using an acquisition
time of 0.25 s—performances improve when using longer time
acquisitions.
All the data used for our analysis have been released as open-
source, to enable the community to validate our findings and use
such data as a ready-to-use basis for further investigations.
Index Terms—UAV; Acoustic features; Payload Weight detec-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last few years have witnessed the exponential diffusion
of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technology [1]. UAVs,
also referred to as drones, are nowadays pervasive, opening
up to advances and innovations in a variety of use-cases
and application scenarios, including perimeter control, remote
surveillance, emergency management, merchandise delivery,
and military applications, to name a few [2]. Considering
only the logistic transportation sector, specialized agencies
estimate an increase of the market size of more than 29 billion
USD from 2022 to 2027 [3], and popular companies such as
Amazon are already testing platforms to deliver merchandise
to selected customers using drones [4].
Unfortunately, drones represent the classical dual-use tech-
nology that can also be used by malicious entities. Indeed, sev-
eral attacks have been already realized using remotely-piloted
or autonomous drones, equipped with explosive charges and
weapons [5], [6], [7]. At the same time, leading merchandise
industries are delaying the introduction of drones, due to
increasing concerns about the safety of the surrounding people,
as well as tampering and theft of both the drone and the carried
merchandise [8].
The above concerns motivated several contributions from
the scientific community. On the one hand, a variety of
solutions for the detection of an approaching drone have been
introduced, based either on radar [9], visual target recogni-
tion [10], Radio-Frequency (RF) analysis [11], traffic analy-
sis [12], and sound analysis [13]. On the other hand, a few
solutions to secure drone merchandise operations have been
proposed, mainly focused on the detection of the most com-
mon RF attacks, such as jamming and spoofing of Global Nav-
igation Satellites System (GNSS) technologies [14], [15], [16].
Concerning the analysis of the sound produced by a drone,
the rationale behind its application is that the acoustic noise
produced by the motors and the blades of the drones represents
a unique feature, clearly distinguishing drones from other
targets, as well as drones from other drones. Therefore, audio
analysis has been used for the detection of the drone in
an outdoor environment [13], as well as to discriminate the
particular brands and models of drones [17].
However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the previous
scientific contributions investigated the potential of using
acoustic emissions generated by a drone to infer the weight of
the carried payload. Such a zero-touch detection method can
have several heterogeneous applications. In the merchandising
sector, a customer equipped with a dedicated system can
realize if the weight of the payload carried by the drone
is consistent with the weight of the expected goods. If the
detected value differs from the expected one, he could refuse
the drone to approach, limiting possible disputes about the
delivery. In the military sector, it could be possible to verify if
a drone used for autonomous or remotely-piloted exploration
has been captured and tampered with—for instance, equipped
with explosive materials. All these applications could leverage
the previous knowledge of the specific brand and model of
the drone, and could take place when the drone is hovering in
front of the acquisition system. In addition, when coupled with
existing methods for drone brand and model identification,
using the acoustic emissions for payload weight detection
could increase the capability to detect in advance threats to
critical infrastructures.
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2Contribution. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to investigate the existing tight correlation between the
acoustic noise produced by a commercial drone and the weight
of the carried payload. We run an extensive experimental
campaign over a reference 3DR Solo drone, and we verified
that the adjustments in the speed of the motors and blades of
the drone, required to adapt the thrust to different payload
weights, leads to a change in the profile of the acoustic
emissions of the drone. This side-channel can be used to infer
on the weight of the payload carried by the drone, by using
different techniques.
We presented two scenarios, characterized by either con-
straints on the capabilities of the devices used for the analysis
of the sound, or by regular processing capabilities, such as
the ones of a regular laptop. We showed that a system using
only the pitch of the sound can discriminate if a drone is
carrying a payload or not, with an accuracy that depends
on both the size of the acquisition window and the specific
payload carried by the drone. Conversely, a system using the
Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) representation
of the audio signal and standard supervised Machine Learning
(ML) techniques can detect the approximate payload carried
by the drone (with an accuracy of 50 g), with a minimum clas-
sification accuracy of 98%, acquiring the acoustic emissions
for only 0.25 s. Further analyses on the effect of the noise
strengthen the validity of our findings. The data used for our
analysis have been publicly-released as open-source, to enable
interested researchers to verify our claims and to employ these
data as a ready-to-use basis for further investigations [18].
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II reviews the related work, Section III discusses
the different scenarios suggested for this work, Section IV
introduces the experimental setup used in this work, Section
V provides the details of the components of the sound that
are critical for the identification of the payload carried by the
drone, while Section VI includes the results of our investiga-
tion in the identified reference scenarios, as well as an analysis
of the impact of the noise. Finally, Section VII concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A few contributions in the last years investigated the pos-
sibility to identify the presence of a drone via its acoustic
emissions. For instance, the authors in [13] designed an ML
framework that utilizes features extracted using the linear
Linear Predictive Cepstral Coefficients (LPCC) and MFCC
techniques to detect and classify amateur drone sounds, com-
pared to a few other sound sources. The authors collected a
small dataset consisting of 172 Samples (maximum duration
of 55s) across four categories of sounds (i.e., drones, thunder-
storms, birds and airplanes) in a noisy environment, using an
array of microphones. Overall, they achieved 96.7% detection
accuracy using MFCC only (as it outperforms LPCC) and the
cubic SVM classification algorithm.
The authors in [19] used a combination of time and fre-
quency domain features to fingerprint the drones’ sounds.
They collected around 850 samples of each of some different
environmental sounds such as nature daytime, train passing,
crowd, street with traffic, in addition to the drone sounds.
Then, the features extracted from these recordings were passed
to an Support Vector Machine (SVM) algorithm using the
Gaussian Radial Basis kernel (RBF) for classification. Overall,
they achieved over 95% accuracy for identifying drone sounds
among other sounds in the test set.
The authors in [20] evaluated the effectiveness of several
ML models, such as Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), Re-
current Neural Networks (RNN), and Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN), to detect and classify drone sounds using
MFCC features. They collected 64 seconds of raw drone
sounds in a quiet outdoor place, using a single microphone
located at distances of 30 meters, 70 meters, and 150 meters
from the drone. They also collected 677 seconds of raw
background sound from the ordinary real-life environment,
with background noises such as airplanes, people chatting, and
cars passing. In addition, they used publicly-available datasets
mixed with the raw drone sounds to compensate for the lack of
drone sounds in heterogeneous environments. The RNN model
generated the best F-Score of 0.8009.
The authors in [17] proposed a drones sound detection
technique based on MFCC features and using the hidden
Markov model (HMM) tool for the classification. They tested
their model on a database of several sounds, consisting of
four drones, six cars, four planes, and four rain sounds. They
organized the extracted features in five clusters, achieving an
overall classification accuracy of up to 100%, depending on the
clusters selected for training and testing. They also evaluated
the effect of the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) on
the extracted features, and they show that the classification
performance is more than 80% at Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
of 5 dB, while it reaches the of 100% at SNR of 16 dB
onwards.
The authors in [21] designed a real-time UAV sound de-
tection system based on artificial neural networks. The pro-
posed system used the UrbanSound8K dataset for non-drone
existing training sounds, including general sounds such as air
conditioner, car horn, children playing, dog bark, drilling, and
motors idling, to name a few. The system applies the Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT) tool on the real-time sampled data
and detects drones using Plotted Image Machine Learning
(PIL) on the visualized FFT graph, by comparing the average
image similarity with a reference FFT template associated
with a target of interest. In addition, the system collects
drones sound data from many reference points and merge them
into a general comprehensive artificial neural network model,
reporting the accuracy of 86.3%.
The authors in [22] designed ADS-ZJU, i.e., a hybrid
anti-drone system that combines heterogeneous surveillance
technologies, such as video, audio, and RF sensors. The acous-
tic signal features were extracted using Short-time Fourier
transform (STFT), as well as reference features for video and
RF signals. These values were used as the input of an SVM
algorithm for drone detection. The detection accuracy achieved
using only acoustics signals ranges from 21.1% at 100m to
87.4% at 20m distance from the drone.
The sound used by a drone has been also used for tracking
3and localization purposes. In this context, the authors in [23]
designed an acoustic system made up of two tetrahedron-shape
acoustic arrays, aimed at collecting sounds periodically from
the surrounding environment. The sounds recorded through
the system are processed according to the Time Difference
of Arrival (TDoA) estimation algorithm and the Gauss a-
priori probability density function (GPDF), to perform drones
localization. The range of the system is around 100m.
The authors in [24] used a small tetrahedral microphone
array to collect acoustic signals from class I Unmanned Aerial
System (UAS) (characterized by a Maximum Gross Takeoff
Weight (MGTOW) of less than 9 kg). These sounds are used to
detect the presence of a drone, leveraging an adaptive Kalman
filter for drone tracking and a beamforming algorithm for
drone detection. They achieved a detection accuracy of 99.5%
when using a pass-band filter of 800-1700 Hz for ranges below
600 meters, reporting a 3% false alarm rate.
The authors in [25] developed a drone detection and position
estimation system based on a wireless acoustic sensor network,
using the SVM algorithm for classification, and commercial
Software Defined Radio (SDR) coupled with ML scheme to
decode the UAVs telemetry protocols. They used an array of
seven microphones to collect acoustic signals so that the data
from any of the four orthogonal microphones can estimate the
drone position, using the TDoA algorithm. They achieved a
drone detection accuracy of 95% using the SVM algorithm,
leveraging the features extracted using the STFT, and using the
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique for dimension
reduction.
The authors in [26] designed SoundUAV, i.e., a system
to fingerprint drones based on their acoustic noise. They
evaluated 54 motors and 11 drones of the same make and
model with 99.48% classification accuracy.
The authors in [27] combined the Linear Predictive Coding
(LPC) and the zero-crossing rate (ZCR) techniques to develop
a drone sound detection system. They recorded the sound
emitted from some drones using three microphones, in an
anechoic chamber with 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80% and
90% of the drones throttle level, and they extracted reference
features. Then, they chose 50% throttle level recordings -
which is approximately the level when the drone starts to
hover - to create a reference database. They achieved the
most successful test results using the WLtoys V262 Cyclone
Quadcopter (close to 100% accuracy, using sounds recorded
at a distance less than 20m), while the worst performances
were achieved using the small Hubsan X4 (around 80%
classification accuracy, using sounds recorded at a distance
less than 10m).
In the field, there are also a few commercial solutions. It
is worth mentioning the Discovair G2 [28] system, which
is a counter-UAS solution that utilizes an array of 128 in-
terconnected microphones to establish a real-time azimuth
and elevation of the target, using advanced digital signal
processing. Similarly, DroneShield [29] is another solution that
incorporates acoustic sensors in a multi-sensor framework, to
create an anti-drone platform. Another solution is Ctrl+Sky
[30], which is a multi-sensor counter-drone system that can
detect, track, and neutralize drones.
Table I summarizes the discussion above, cross-comparing
the discussed studies across several system features, such as
the used classifier, the features, the eventual consideration of
the noise, the specific hardware, and the distance from the
target. We notice that, at the time of this writing, none of the
analyzed contributions investigated the impact of the payload
the drone is carrying on the profile of the emitted sound. In
addition, none of them provided hints on how to identify the
weight the drone is carrying. Finally, note also that most of
the previous work did not release the data used for the related
analysis.
III. REFERENCE SCENARIOS
In this paper, we considered two reference scenarios, illus-
trated in Figure 1 and discussed below.
Fig. 1: Reference Scenarios considered in our work.
Scenario 1. In this scenario, we assume that a microphone
is deployed in a remote location, e.g., a desert or an agri-
culture field. Due to the nature of the scenario, we assume
that it is unfeasible to deploy a wireless camera to allow a
remote administrator to immediately visualize the drone. The
microphone is connected to a constrained device, such as an
Internet of Things (IoT) device, that has limited computational
capabilities. Given the reduced capabilities of the computing
device, we assign it a lightweight objective: to detect if the
drone is carrying a payload, or not. Further, we assume that
other systems, already available in the literature, are deployed
in conjunction with our system both to identify the type of
the drone via its audio recordings (e.g., [26]) and to identify
if the drone is hovering or moving (e.g., [31]). As we will
show later on, the IoT device can record the drone sound for
a limited time, and then analyze the pitch of the recorded
sound to identify if the drone is carrying a payload or not.
Scenario 2. In this scenario, we consider a collaborative
use-case, where a user would like to determine if a specific
well-known drone is carrying a specific payload. Specifically,
we assume that a user is receiving a specific package via a
drone-based delivery system, such as the ones already in place
by commercial entities, such as Amazon [32] [33]. Despite
4Ref. Classifier Features Noise Hardware Distance [m] Weight
Detection
[13] Cubic SVM MFCC realenvironment microphonesarray
- 7
[17] HMM MFCC AWGN - - 7
[19] RBF SVM STE, ZCR, TC,
SC, SRO, MFCC
real
environment Audio sensor - 7
[20] GMM, RNN,
CNN
MFCC quiet outdoor place +
added noise
single
microphone
30, 70, 150 7
[21] PIL, ANN FFT realenvironment Low costmicrophones
- 7
[22] SVM STFT realenvironment 4-Mics array 20-100 7
[23] TDoA GPDF realenvironment Two tetrahedralarrays
100 7
[24] Threshold beam forming
algorithm
real
environment Tetrahedral array 600 7
[25] SVM STFT realenvironment 7 mics array - 7
[26] RBF SVM Cepstral features Labenvironment Blue Yeti Promicrophone
- 7
[27] Threshold LPC, ZCR anechoicchamber 3 microphones 2-40 7
Our
paper
Cubic SVM MFCC real environment and
AWGN
Rode VideoMic
Pro
7 0-500g
TABLE I: Overview and Comparison of related contributions on drones acoustic analysis.
a manual inspection of the package could be preferable to
identify if the delivery is as expected, often opening a package
could compromise the possibility for the user to ask for a
refund or replacement of the item. Therefore, without touching
the drone nor the package the drone is carrying, but only by
analyzing the sound emitted by the drone, the user would
like to verify that the weight of the payload the drone is
carrying is compatible with the one he/she is expecting. Note
that this is a more sophisticated scenario, where it is required
to distinguish finer payload differences—we set the bar to 50
grams. Therefore, we assume that the drone hovers in front
of the house of the customer for a limited time, where there
is a microphone, directly connected to a standard laptop. On
the laptop, the customer has installed a software tool that can
analyze the sound emitted by the drone and identify if the
payload the drone is carrying is different from the expected
one. To achieve its objective, the software tool can leverage a
pre-trained machine learning model, where the model of the
drone is known in advance—this tool could be provided by
the seller or by a trusted third party.
We highlight that the two scenarios described above are only
a reference, and our research can be directly applicable also
to other use-cases. For instance, surveillance towers around
critical infrastructures can deploy the proposed system to
get an estimation of the weight of the payload a drone is
carrying. Indeed, having an estimation of an unauthorized
drone weight and payload can be beneficial in determining
the best countermeasure plan. Another use-case applies to
military bases, where the drone has to hover in-place before
entering the base, to examine its sound fingerprint and verify
that the drone is not carrying an extra payload compared to
the expected one.
Finally, we emphasize that, in all the use-cases discussed
above, we assume that the drone is not moving, but hovering
at a given distance from the microphone. The reason for this
choice will be clearer later on and is mainly due to the hardly-
predictable patterns that the sound produces when activating
its motors for moving. On the one hand, we emphasize that
considering a hovering drone is pretty reasonable for the real-
life use-cases identified above, where this requirement does not
represent a serious limitation. On the other hand, we highlight
that, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first
one to analyze the relationship existing between the sound
a drone emits and the payload it is carrying, and analyzing
the modification of the sound of the drone when the drone is
moving is left as future work, to further boost the research
efforts in the UAV domain.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we illustrate the equipment used for the
acquisition and processing of the sound emitted from an UAV.
Figure 2 shows the setup we used for our experiments.
The details of our equipment are reported in the following.
Drone. We selected the 3DR SOLO drone [34]. It is
a medium-sized commercial drone, weighing about 1.5 kg,
including the 14.8 V battery (approx. 0.5 kg). The drone can
carry a maximum payload weight of 700g, including the 3DR
Gimbal and a GoPro, weighting approximately 390g [35]. In
our experiments, we did not include these optional elements,
and thus we tested payloads up to a weight of 500g. We also
remark that we used the drone as it is out of the box, without
any hardware or software modification. The 3DR Solo drone
is characterized by an open-source architecture, featuring the
Pixhawk 2.0 flight controller and the ArduCopter 3.3 firmware,
currently adopted by more than 30 commercial drones [31].
5Fig. 2: Equipment setup for the live measurements of the sound
emitted from the drone.
Microphone. To record the sound emitted from the drone,
we used the Rode VideoMic Pro directional microphone [36].
It is a battery-powered directional microphone, equipped with
embedded filters and level controls. The native bandwidth of
the microphone includes the range [40Hz, 20kHz], and low-
bandwidth noises such as air conditioners and traffic noises
could be automatically rejected thanks to an optional high-pass
filter at 80Hz. It also includes a −10 dB level attenuator, ideal
for recording loud or very-close noise sources. The connection
to the host is provided using a 3.5mm stereo mini-jack output
(dual mono) [36].
Laptop. For the analysis of the sounds recorded from the
drone, we used a MacBook Pro laptop, equipped with a 2.9
GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16 GB of RAM.
Mission Planner software tool. Mission Planner is a
software tool used to interface with the 3DR Solo drone, to
get telemetry data, and to instruct the drone to accomplish
a specific mission. In this paper, we use this tool to get
information about the rotation speed of the motors, and a few
other pieces of information, such as the ones related to the
stability of the drone.
Measurements Collection. To collect the measurements,
we used the Audacity audio software tool [37]. It is an easy-
to-use, multi-track audio editor, that allows to easily select the
parameters for the audio collection and the configuration of the
microphone. Specifically, we notice that all the sounds used
for this work were collected at the sampling rate of 44.1 KHz,
to maintain a good recording quality over the microphone’s
20 kHz frequency bandwidth, in accordance to existing works
[17], [26].
The drone sound recordings were collected in an open, outdoor
environment, placing the microphone at a distance of 7 meters
from the hovering drone. For each measurement, lasting 170
seconds, the weight payload that the drone was carrying has
been changed. We experimented with a total of 11 different
payload weights, ranging from 0 g to 500 g, with steps of
50 g. We remark that each recording starts at the time the
drone is hovering, and it ends before the drone lands, to
capture only the sound of the drone hovering in place. The
use-cases corresponding to this specific behavior of the drone
are consistent with the scenarios described in Section III. All
the data gathered for this study have been publicly-released as
open-source [18].
The output of audacity is a WAV file, that is provided as input
to the Matlab 2019b software tool for analysis.
V. SOUND COMPONENTS ANALYSIS
One of the most diffused metrics to analyze a generic sound
is the pitch. The pitch of a sound is defined as the fundamental
frequency of an audio signal [38]. For instance, in the context
of speech analysis, the pitch is often used to discriminate male
from female voices, or to identify the specific speaker. Overall,
identifying the pitch of a signal is not straightforward, as
natural sounds arise as the combination of different frequency
components, alternating in period and/or amplitude [39].
Considering the sound emitted by a generic drone, several
components contribute to defining the pitch of the emitted
sound. In line with related works on sound analysis, we found
that two components are mainly contributing to the sound:
motors and blades [40].
First, the rotation speed of the motors, measured in
Revolutions Per Minute (RPM), contributes significantly to the
sound emitted by the drone. Specifically, a drone continuously
monitors and adjusts its motors rotation speed, to keep stability
and compensate external factors. We highlight that the rotation
speed of the motor is not fixed, but oscillates in a given
interval. When the drone is hovering, the Electronic Speed
Controller (ESC) component functions to maintain a steady
rotation of the motors, to preserve the drone stability and
adjust its position. If the drone is moving, the oscillation of
the motors rounds depends on its speed, wind conditions, and
other factors related to its stability, such as the compensation
of a particular movement. In addition, the blades contribute
to the sound emitted by the drone. The blades determine the
efficiency and smoothness of the flight, and their presence is
key to allow the drone to fly.
To show the variation of the pitch during a specific interval,
in Figure 3, we report the full spectrogram of the sound
recorded from the 3DR solo drone at the reference distance
of 7 meters from the microphone, when no payload is carried
by the drone.
We can see that the strongest components, i.e., the frequency
components characterized by higher sound emissions, are
located in the low-frequency range, below 7 kHz. In line with
the findings of the authors in [40], we identify these frequency
components to be associated with the blades of the drone.
To get more insights about the average speed of the motors
when the drone carries different payload weights, we leveraged
the telemetry data provided by the Mission Planner tool.
Figure 4 shows the histogram of the average drone motors
RPM, as extracted from Mission Planner software tool, and
their relationship to three different reference payload weights
carried by the drone, i.e., 0 g, 300 g, and 500 g, respectively.
First, we notice that for a particular payload weight carried
by the drone the motors average speed is not constant. As
6Fig. 3: Full Spectrogram of drone sound, when no payload
is carried, over 170 seconds. Lighter colors correspond to
stronger frequency components.
Fig. 4: Motors average speed distribution at different payload
weights
previously highlighted, this is due to the continuous adjust-
ments that the drone performs on the speed of the motors,
to compensate instantaneous drops or movements, due to the
pressure, inertia, and other environmental conditions (e.g.,
wind).
We also notice a clear difference between the recordings
for different weights. Indeed, the motors of the drone have to
rotate faster when the weight of the payload is higher, for the
drone to hover and stabilize its position.
In the Scenario 1 considered in this paper, we will focus on
the pitch of the signal, and we will consider both the blades
sound and the motors sound, even if the blades sound is the
most prominent component. More details will be provided in
Section VI-A.
At the same time, from Figure 3, we can see that there
are several harmonics for the pitch, mainly located below the
frequency of 7 kHz. To take into account these components, we
can use the Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) tool.
The MFCC is a technique to describe the different frequency
components of the signal, and it is often used to best describe
how the human phonetic system perceives the audio signals.
Figure 5 depicts the features extraction steps using the
MFCC technique [41].
Fig. 5: Extraction of the MFCC components of an audio signal.
The input to the process is the digital representation of
the audio signal, as it is provided from the microphone.
A preliminary pre-emphasis stage is applied to enhance the
energy of the higher frequencies of the sound and to improve
the related Signal-to-Noise Ratio. Then, the MFCC divides
the recorded window in very short time windows, where the
features of the input can be assumed as stationary. Later, the
technique computes the FFT of each window, and shifts the
components to an alternative frequency axis, referred to as
the non-linear Mel scale, further divided into a set of bands,
known as the Mel bands. Specifically, the content of each Mel
band is computed according to Eq. 1.
Mel(f) = 2595 · log10
(
1 +
f
700
)
. (1)
Then, the technique envisions the computation of the loga-
rithm of the Mel spectrum (referred to as D(m)), and finally,
the computation of the cepstral coefficients c(n) using the
discrete cosine transform (DCT), according to the following
Eq. 2.
cn =
M−1∑
m=0
D(m) cos
[
pin(m− 0.5)
M
]
, (n = 0, . . . , R) , (2)
where R is the total number of MFCC coefficients and
the index m identifies the specific Mel-band. Note that
the MFCC components consider the input frequency range
[633, 6, 854] Hz, thus being perfectly applicable to our prob-
lem.
As a reference example for the value of the MFCC features
in the analysis of the weight carried by the drone, in Figure 6,
we show the relationship existing between two reference
MFCC components of the signals recorded when the refer-
ence drone carries payloads with different weights, i.e., the
28th (bandwidth [2, 618, 3, 004] Hz) and the 29th (bandwidth
[2, 804, 3, 217] Hz). Note that the MFCC components showed
in the figure have been computed considering the reference
time windows of 1 s.
We can notice that there is a clear trend in the relationship
between the showed MFCC components. First, we notice that
7Fig. 6: Relationship between the MFCC components 28 and
29, extracted from the recordings of the sound of a drone
carrying different weights, from 0 g to 500 g, considering a
time window of 1 s.
similar weights produce points that are very close to each
other, creating well-defined clusters. At the same time, we
can notice that, with the increase in the weight carried by the
drone, the cluster moves down across a line, parallel to the
reference line y = x, indicating a clear correlation between
the weight carried by the drone and the produced points.
We remark that Figure 6 shows the relationship only be-
tween two of the several available MFCC components. In
Section VI we will show how the MFCC of the signals can
be used to discriminate the specific weight of the payload a
drone is carrying.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section, we report the results of our investigation
about the capability to detect the weight of the payload a drone
is carrying, based on the analysis of the sound emitted by the
drone. Specifically, Section VI-A illustrates the results for the
Scenario 1 described before, while the results for the Scenario
2 are reported in Section VI-B.
A. Scenario 1
We recall that the Scenario 1 introduced in Section III
involves devices that do not have extensive computational ca-
pabilities, and therefore they can rely on lightweight operations
only. The objective, in this case, is to ascertain whether the
drone is carrying a payload.
Based on the analysis carried out in Section V, we identify
the pitch of the sound emitted by the drone as a feasible tool
to accomplish such an objective.
Specifically, based on our observations and the values
reported by the Mission Planner software tool, we identi-
fied that the pitch of the sound recorded by the drone is
always in the range [180− 235] Hz, despite instantaneous
noise components can distort its smooth identification on the
receiving microphone. Therefore, on the sound recorded by
the microphone, we apply a band-pass filter in the frequency
range [180− 235] Hz, to filter out noise components.
We recorded the drone sound for 11 different weights,
ranging from 0 g to 500 g, with 50 g step, for a duration
of 170 s each. Then, we divided each trace into shorter time-
slots, each lasting 2.5 s, obtaining 68 reference time blocks for
each recording. Figure 7 reports the probability distribution
function of the pitch for the sound generated by the drone
when the drone is hovering while carrying different payload
weights. For the sake of clarity, we show only 6 reference
distributions.
Fig. 7: Probability distribution function associated to the
values of the pitch, recorded for different payload weights and
computed over a reference time windows of 2.5 seconds.
In line with the content of the previous Figure 4, we notice
that increasing the payload weight leads to an increase in the
mean value of the associated pitch frequency. This is due to the
frequent oscillations and adjustments performed by the motors
and the blades of the drone, leading to a dispersed profile
around the mean pitch value. We also note that the variance of
the extracted probability density functions is almost the same
for all the recordings, but the one for the higher payload weight
of 500 g. Our intuition is that the drone oscillates more with
payload weights close to the maximum, and thus it requires
more thrust to compensate for the turbulence experienced
while hovering.
We also notice that similar payload weights are character-
ized by partially overlapping probability distribution functions,
making it hard to detect the specific weight carried by the
drone by looking only at the pitch of the sound. On the one
hand, we highlight that the recordings have been obtained
using a low-end directional microphone, that has not been
designed specifically for highly-precision tasks. Thus, we
expect that more performing microphones should be able to
remove noise components, further enhancing the identification
of the pitch. On the other hand, we notice that the higher the
payload weight carried by the drone, the lower the probability
8that the profile of the distribution function of this high payload
weight overlaps with the one corresponding to 0 g, i.e., the
sound of the drone when no payload is carried.
To show the capability to discern whether a drone is carrying
a payload via the pitch of the sound only, we considered
each of the tested weights, and we computed the pitch over
an increasing time window, from 0.25 s to 2.5 s. Then, we
evaluated how many samples from each distribution fall within
the distribution corresponding to the 0 g payload weight (i.e.,
the error rate). The results are reported in Figure 8.
Fig. 8: Error Rate of discriminating if the drone is carrying a
payload or not, by considering different weights and increasing
time windows.
We notice the error rate in the identification of a payload
carried by the drone depends both on the specific weight
carried by the drone and by the size of the time window, i.e.,
the acquisition time of the recording. Considering a specific
time window, we notice that the error rate decreases with the
increase of the weight carried by the drone. Indeed, recalling
Figure 7, the probability that the distribution corresponding
to a specific weight carried by the drone overlaps with the
distribution corresponding to 0 g decreases with the increase of
the weight carried by the drone. At the same time, computing
the pitch over a larger time frame helps to reduce spurious
oscillations, due to the adjustments that the motors of the drone
perform to keep stability and compensate external effects.
For instance, considering the weight of 200 g payload, while
computing the pitch over a time-frame of 0.25 s leads to
an error rate of the 42%, computing the pitch over a time-
frame of 2.5 s leads to a negligible error rate, very close
to 0. We also notice that lighter weights, such as 50 or 100
g, are characterized by a high error rate, and the only way
to mitigate this effect is to increase the time-frame of the
recording. Depending on the particular application scenario,
this could be challenging (e.g., adversarial scenarios, where
the system does not have control of the drone).
B. Scenario 2
We recall that the Scenario 2 introduced in Section III
involves devices that do not have strict constraints in their
computational capabilities, and therefore, they can rely on
more processing-intensive operations. The objective, in this
case, is to identify the specific weight of the payload that the
drone is carrying.
Based on the analysis carried out in Section V, we identify
the MFCC components of the sound emitted by the drone as
a feasible tool to accomplish such an objective.
System Setup. We set up a system composed of different
stages, as shown in Figure 9.
Fig. 9: Overview of the system set up to identify the weight
carried by the drone via its acoustic emissions.
More in detail, for each of the collected recordings, we
divided the trace into two parts. We adopt the first one as the
Training Set, consisting of the 70% of the size of the recording
(approximately 120 s), while the second part (Testing Set),
consists of the remaining 30% (approximately 50 s) of the
recording. For both sets, we obtained a spectral representation
based on 40 MFCC components, characterizing the content
and the distribution of the sound within each bandwidth in the
range of the microphone. Table II summarizes the parameters
used to generate the MFCC components.
TABLE II: Parameters used for the extraction of the MFCC
components.
Parameter Value
Sound sample length per instance 0.25 s, 1 s
Sampling frequency, fs 44.1 kHz
Window Size 0.03fs[s]
Overlap Length 0.02fs[s]
FFT Length 0.03fs [s]
Number of features 40
To show the effect of an increasing time window, we
consider two different time windows for the MFCC features
generation: t1 = 0.25 s and t2 = 1 s.
Then, for the classification task, we used the Support Vector
Machine algorithm. To introduce the logic of the SVM, let us
consider the toy example in Figure 10.
We recall that the SVM technique is based on the creation
of an optimal hyperplane (H), that acts as a decision boundary
maximizing the margin of separation (m = (m+) + (m−)) be-
tween the considered classes [42], [43]. The training samples
that are used to support the creation and the optimal location
of the hyperplane are referred to as Support Vectors (SV), and
they can be represented as per equation Eq. 3.
wT · x+ b = ±1, (3)
where w is the normal weight vector orthogonal to the
hyperplane H , x is the input vector, and b is the bias. We
9Fig. 10: Logic of the SVM classifier
highlight that, despite the SVM was designed as a binary
classification tool, it can be generalized to perform multi-
class classification, using techniques such as the One-vs-One
(adopted in this paper). Overall, assuming N classes, the One-
vs-One technique trains a separate classifier for each different
pair of classes in a dataset, generating
(
N
2
)
= N(N−1)2 classi-
fiers [44]. A specific sample is assigned to the most feasible
one of two classes, and the process is repeated considering
that specific class and all the other classifiers. In the end, the
class with the maximum number of votes among all generated
classifiers is considered as the reference one for the sample
classification.
The capability of the decision boundary to separate different
classes is improved when the input data are moved to a higher-
dimensional space, through a process known as the kernel trick
[45]. This technique enhances the capabilities of the SVM,
allowing to classify non-linearly separable data. More in detail,
the SVM polynomial kernel is defined as in the following
Eq. 4.
K(x1, x2) = (x
T
1 · x2 + 1)p, (4)
where p is the order of the polynomial. When p = 1, the
classification tool is referred to as linear SVM, when p = 2
it is a quadratic SVM, when p = 3 it is a cubic SVM, and so
on. The specific degree of the polynomial in Eq. 4 should be
chosen smartly, in a way to avoid over-fitting and adapt to the
possible slight variations in the testing set.
Classification Results. We implemented the system previ-
ously described using Matlab R2019a. In line with the analysis
carried out in the previous subsection regarding the pitch,
the size of the time window considered for the extraction
of the MFCC components has an impact on the accuracy of
the classification. To render this phenomenon, in Figure 11
we report the relationship between two reference MFCC
components, the 28th (bandwidth [2, 618, 3, 004] Hz) and the
Fig. 11: Relationship between the MFCC components 28
and 29, extracted from the recordings of the sound of a
drone carrying different payload weights, from 0 g to 500 g,
considering a time window of 0.25 s.
29th (bandwidth [2, 804, 3, 217] Hz), when considering a time-
window of 0.25 s. We recall that the relationship between the
same MFCC components for a time-window of 1 s has been
already reported in Figure 6.
As previously highlighted, we notice the clear correlation
existing between the points corresponding to the same weights.
Indeed, they are located very close to each other, forming
well-defined clusters. At the same time, note that increasing
the weight by 50 g leads to a shift of the cluster along a
line that is mostly parallel to the bisect, further showing the
clear relationship existing between the recorded sound and the
specific payload weight carried by the drone. This behavior
could also be beneficial to predict the sound expected for
weights whose corresponding sound has not been recorded.
An exception to this general behavior can be found for the
samples of payload weights higher than 400 g, and could
be explained with the abnormal activity performed by the
motors and the blades to keep stability—needed when carrying
a payload weight that is close to the maximum allowed one.
Furthermore, comparing Figure 11 with Figure 6 previously
introduced, we notice that considering a shorter time window
for the extraction of the MFCC components leads to an
increasing overlap between neighboring payload weights. The
reason is similar to the one generating the overlapping between
the pitch of neighboring weights, and it is rooted in the fact
that considering larger time windows mitigates transient noise
effects, due to the continuous adjustments and compensations
performed by the drone to keep a stable position against
external environmental factors. At the same time, increasing
the time window, i.e., increasing the recording time, increases
also the probability to obtain different values of the MFCC
components even for close payload weights, hence improving
the classification accuracy.
We remark that we showed the MFCC components 28 and
29 as they are among the most representative ones for the
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classification of the payload weight carried by the drone (two
of the top four). However, other MFCC components are also
relevant, and they further help in correctly classifying points
that are located at the boundaries of the clusters showed
in Figure 11. However, given the large number of available
combinations for the whole set of 40 MFCC components, we
do not show them explicitly.
To justify the use of the SVM classification technique and
to evaluate its feasibility for the payload weight acoustic
recognition task, we applied several widely-used supervised
ML classification algorithms to the MFCC components of
the sound recorded when the drone carries different payload
weights. They are: 1) Linear Discriminant (LD), 2) Quadratic
Discriminant (QD), 3) Linear SVM (LSVM), 4) Quadratic
SVM (QSVM), 5) Cubic SVM (CSVM), 6) Fine k-Nearest
Neighbors (KNN) (FKNN), 7) Subspace KNN (SKNN), 8)
Bagged Trees (BT), 9) Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB), and,
finally, 10) Kernel Naive Bayes (KNB). To cross-compare the
performance of the different classifiers, we use the standard
metric of the Classification Accuracy, defined as in Eq. 5.
Classification Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
(5)
where TP refers to the True Positives, TN to the True
Negatives, FP to the False Positives, and, finally, FN to the
False Negatives.
In Figure 12 we report the classification accuracy achieved
by each of the above-introduced classifiers, considering a time-
window of a) 0.25 s and b) 1 s for the computation of the
MFCC components. We remark that the results have been
obtained using the 70% of the samples for the training, and
the remaining 30% were used as the test set. Similar results
have been also achieved using the well-known cross-validation
technique.
Figure 12 conveys a few interesting considerations. First of
all, we notice that all the tested classifiers report classification
accuracies over 89% (the minimum classification accuracy is
reported by the GNB classifier in Fig. 12a, and it is 89.5%).
This finding confirms that, independently from the chosen
algorithm to accomplish sound classification, there is a clear
relationship between the sound emitted by the drone over the
whole acoustic frequency range and the payload weight carried
by the drone. We remark that, at the time of this writing, to
the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the contributions
present in the literature highlighted this correlation.
In addition, we notice that increasing the acquisition time
from 0.25 s to 1 s improves the classification accuracy for
all the tested classifiers. This finding further confirms the
beneficial effect of increasing the observation time, to get rid
of the noise components and the adjustments carried out by
the drone to stabilize.
We also notice that several classifiers are achieving very
high accuracy. For instance, looking at Figure 12b, the QD,
LSVM, and QSVM all report a classification accuracy of
98.9%. However, comparing all the classifiers across the differ-
ent recording times, we notice that the cubic SVM classifier
is the one characterized by the least performance shift, i.e.,
0.1%.
Without loss of generality, recalling our discussion about the
classification logic of the SVM, we find that, independently
from the degree of the kernel polynomial, the SVM achieves
stable and higher classification accuracy. This is mainly due
to the enhanced suitability of the hyper-planes logic in identi-
fying and constraining the clusters across the different MFCC
components, while getting rid of unstable readings. Despite the
excellent achieved results, we remark that this paper aims to
provide experimental evidence that the sound emitted by the
drone can be tightly correlated with the payload weight the
drone is carrying, and not to find the most suitable classifier
to use for this problem—this objective is left for future work.
Finally, for the sake of completeness and to provide further
insights, in Figure 13, we show the confusion matrices resulted
from the application of the cubic SVM classification tool when
considering the MFCC components extracted over recordings
of 0.25 s and 1 s, respectively.
Looking at the reported results, we notice that most of the
few samples that are wrongly classified are obtained among
recordings with adjacent payload weight classes. This is a
reasonable and expected finding, as the motors and blades
rotation speeds are very similar when the drone is carrying
similar payload weights. Looking at Figure 13b, we also notice
that all the errors related to non-adjacent classes are removed
when the recording time increases to 1 s, further highlighting
the beneficial effect of increased recording time in getting rid
of short and transient noise fluctuation effects.
Noise Analysis. As previously discussed in Section IV,
the sound recordings of the drone carrying different payload
weights have been collected in a standard outdoor environ-
ment, characterized by noise typical of an urban scenario, such
as birds sounds, cars passing in the background, wind, and
people voices, to name a few. However, we could mostly get
rid of these noise components by pointing the directional mi-
crophone toward the drone, in a way that the sound produced
by the drone would be dominant. However, in real use-cases as
the ones introduced in Section III, several factors could reduce
the SNR of the recordings. For instance, the orientation of the
microphones could not be optimal, or the distance of the drone
from the recording equipment could not be the most suitable
one, leading to an increased noise level.
To take into account the effect of the noise on the classi-
fication accuracy reported by our methodology, we studied
the effect of an increasing level of noise on the reported
classification accuracy. Considering as a reference the cubic-
SVM classification tool and the two time-windows previously
considered for the sound recordings, we perturbed each of
the traces corresponding to the sound of the drone with
noise following the AWGN model, consistently with other
scientific contributions working on the sound emitted by the
drone [17], [46]. To carry out these tests, we considered a
total number of 183 SNR levels, resulting in SNR values from
0 dB to 8.8 dB. Figure 14 reports the classification accuracy
achieved by the cubic-SVM tool for the different tested SNR
levels, by considering the time-windows of 0.25 s and 1 s.
We can notice that, as expected, the classification accu-
racy increases with the increase in the SNR, reporting an
exponential behavior. Considering the worst-case time-window
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(a) Performance using a time window t = 0.25 s for the computation of the MFCC components.
(b) Performance using a time window t = 1 s for the computation of the MFCC components.
Fig. 12: Classification Accuracy reported by several different supervised ML classifiers in the identification of the weight
carried by the drone using its acoustic noise.
of 0.25 s for the MFCC computation, we highlight that
the accuracy of the cubic-SVM classification tool reaches
the value of 98.4% obtained in our previous analysis for a
minimum SNR value of 8 dB. This means that at least 8 dB
of SNR is required for the sound recording to obtain the
remarkable classification performances previously discussed.
Depending on the required classification accuracy, this lower
bound could be further decreased (for instance, the 95%
classification accuracy is reached starting from an SNR of
4.5 dB). Finally, we notice that increasing the time-window
used for the recordings and the computation of the MFCC
components have a beneficial effect in the robustness to the
noise, with slightly higher performances (approximately 5%
in the range [1, 4.5] dB ).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we have been
the first to show the tight relationship existing between the
payload weight carried by a drone and its unique acoustic
fingerprint. We experimentally proved that the variation of the
thrust required for a drone to hover when carrying different
payload weights leads to differences in the profile of the sound
emitted by the drone, that can be used to obtain an estimation
of the weight that the specific drone is carrying. Our analysis,
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(a) Confusion matrix obtained using a time window t = 0.25 s for
the computation of the MFCC components.
(b) Confusion matrix obtained using a time window t = 1 s for the
computation of the MFCC components.
Fig. 13: Confusion matrices resulting from the application of the cubic SVM classifier to the identification of the weight of
the payload carried by the drone using its acoustic noise.
Fig. 14: Classification accuracy in the detection of the payload
weight carried by the drone, with different SNR values and
different recording times.
conducted using recordings of approximately 170 seconds for
eleven different weights carried by a 3DR SOLO drone, from
0 g to 500 g, shows significant differences in the pitch of the
produced sound, caused by the different speed of the motors
with different payload weights. In a constrained application
scenario, we demonstrated that the pitch of the sound could
be used to identify if a drone is carrying a payload, or not.
In particular, recording the sound for 2.5 s, we showed that a
negligible error rate can be achieved if the drone carries 150 g
of payload or more. When the analysis is carried out on a
normal laptop (relaxing the computational constraints), MFCC
components can be used in combination with a supervised
ML classifier, to obtain remarkable classification accuracy in
the identification of the specific payload weight the drone
is carrying. In this context, we showed that a cubic SVM
classifier can achieve 98.4% classification accuracy over a
recording time of only 0.25 s, while the performances further
improve when the recording time can be increased. Additional
analysis aimed at assessing the impact of noise over the
achieved results showed that such a remarkable classification
accuracy can be obtained when the sound of the drone is
characterized by a minimum Signal-to-Noise Ratio of 8 dB.
All the data used for our analysis have been released as
open-source, to enable practitioners, Industry, and Academia,
to independently validate our findings and to use our data as
a ready-to-use basis for further investigations.
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